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CHAPTER I
The so-called gold reserve was not as Its name indicates a 
reserve at all until late in the nineteenth century. It was, at 
first, simply the annual balance of gold in the Treasury. It was 
not, as sometimes stated, a fund pledged to redeem the legal- 
tender United States notes. In reality it was on.y a part of the 
available cash, and. the proportion and character of the fund 
depended only on the practice of the Treasury from time to time.
In 1861 specie payments were suspended. The people began to 
withdraw their money for hoarding and the specie reserve was 
dwindling rapidly. The war crisis and tn.e suspension of specie 
payments soon rendered the currency system of the country quite 
inadequate. To meet the stringency, the Treasury began issuing 
United States legal-tender notes. The first of these non-interest 
bearing legal-ten er notes was authorized by an act of Congress 
February 12, 1862 and were issued March 10, 1862. These notes 
were legal tender for all debts public and private, except duties 
or imposts, and. interest on the public debt. They were exchange­
able for United States six per-cent bonds and redeemable at the 
pleasure of the United States after five years.1
On June 7, 1862 the Secretary of the Treasury recommended a 
further issue of legal-tender notes to supply the need of more 
currency. A bill authorizing the additional issue of $150,000,000.
2legal-tender notes was signed by the President June 11, 1862.
The act of '“arch 3, 1863 authorized a further issue of 5150,000,000, 
bringing the aggregate issue up to $450,000# The highest 
amount of legal-tender notes outstanding at any one time was on 
January 3, 1864, amounting at that time to $449,338,902. This 
sum included legal tender notes, fractional currency, and short 
term interest bearing notes.^
It was not expected that the notes issued would stay in cir­
culation permanently since all non-interest bearing notes issued, 
with the exeption of fractional currency, were convertible into 
six per cent bonds. In his report for 1865 Secretary of the 
Treasury McCulloch expressed th. opinion that the legal tender 
acts were war measures and ought not to remain in force any longer 
than should be necessary to enable the people to prepare for a 
return to the gold standard.
The greenbacks continued in circulation, however, and the 
currency situation was becoming troublesome. Paper money 
depreciated rapidly and coin was already out of circulation. To 
correct this evil the Secretary of the Treasury recommended the 
retirement of the greenbacks to contract the volume of currency, 
and Congress, by the act of ^arch 12, 1866, authorized the retire­
ment and cancellation of ten millions of legal tencer notes 
within six months of the passage of the act. Under this act the 
amount outstanding was reduced to $356,000,000 on December 31,
1867. Between that date and January 15, 1874 the amount
increased to $382,979,815 and on June 20, 1874 the maximum amount 
outstanding was fixed by law at $382,000,000,3
Besides these United States legal-tender notes there were in 
circulation millions of national bank notes* Section 3 of the 
act of January 14, 1875, authorized the increase of national bank 
notes but required the Secretary of the Treasury to retire 
legal-tender "greenbacks” to an amount equal to eighty per-cent 
of the national bank notes issued, until the amount of greenbacks 
outstanding should be $300,000,000. This act was repealed in 
the Silver Purchase and Coinage act of 1878. Up to that year 
#35,318,984 legal-tender notes were retired, leaving in circula­
tion $346,681,016. Prom May 31, 1878 the Secretary of the 
Treasury was required to re-issue any legal-tender United States 
notes received in the Treasury.^
On April 25, 1870 the Secretary of the Treasury transmitted 
a bill to Congress providing for the revision of the coinage laws 
of the united States* It was considered for- five sessions of 
Congress and It finally became a law February 12, 1873. This act 
provided that the Unit of value of United States currency should 
be the gold dollar. It also provided that the silver coins 
should be a trade dollar of 420 grains Troy, a half dollar, 
quarter, etc. All silver coins were made legal-tender to the 
amount of five dollars. The act also provided that the silver 
dollars previously coined, of which there were but few In 
existence, maintained their legal-tender qualities, but the 
coinage of new full legal-tender dollars was discontinued.5
5
4There was at first complete acquiescence in the result of 
this legislation, and. not until the decline of silver in 1875 
and 1876 were any suggestions made for he further coinage of 
silver dollars. In both these years the currency of the country 
was inconvertible paper and no gold or silver coins were in cir­
culation. Strong agitation for the use of silver as coin, both in 
and out of Congress, especially in the silver producing west and 
in the south, was carried on through the years 1876, 1877, and 
1878. John Sherman, then Secretary of the Treasury, in citing the 
current silver problem in his report of 1877, came out In favor of 
the use of silver as coin but only within certain limitations. He 
warned the country against the dangers of free coinage and recom­
mended limited coinage from bullion purchased by the government on 
the open market, maintaining it by redemption, or otherwise, at 
par with gold coin. He said in effect that if the silver dollar 
was restored to our coin ge it would add to the convenience of the 
people, but should be coined under the same ruins as to issue and 
convertibility as other forms of money. The United States could 
not fix the market price of silver alone, as its price is in­
fluenced byall nations who use t e metal.^
Silver Legislation in 1878
The agitation for trie coinage of silver continued. The two 
factions leading the fight were the Inflationists, who clamored 
for the coinage of silver because it would bring more and cheaper
5money, and the silver producers of the west whose main purpose
was to create a market for their silver.
Notwithstanding the recommendation of the Secretary of the 
Treasury and the veto of the president, an act for the coinage of 
silver dollars was passed by Congress February 28, 1878,7
In analyzing the causes of the passage of the act of 1378 it 
will be found that it 'was passed through the efforts of the silver 
producers, mho united their efforts with the true inflationists.
During the summer of 1876 a number of silver bills came up 
in the House. On July 18, 1876 W. D» Kelley introduced a bill to 
coin standard silver dollars and to restore their legal-tender
Qcharacter. A similar bill was introduced by Bland of Missouri
9July 25, 1876. At the next session Bland reported his original
bill from the committee on mines and mining. This bill was
introduced December 12, 1876 and was the same as that introduced
by Kelley.117 The following autumn the Kelley bill, containing a
free coinage clause, was again brought up by Bland. It passed
without debate November 5, 1877 by a vote of 163 to 44, and was
11sent to the Senate.
In the Senate the hill was In charge of Allison of the 
finance committee. Allison reported the bill with Important 
amendments, the chief of which was the striking out of the provi­
sion granting free coinage, and the bill was made the special 
order for December 11, 1877, and thereafter it received full 
debate. The free coinage provision was struck out and a clause 
directing the government purchase and coinage of not less than
6$2,000,000 worth and not more than '4,000,000 worth per month 
was inserted by a vote of 49 to 22. The silver men were strong 
for full coinage, hut yielded, after fighting the proposed
1 pmeasure, because it was better than none.
The discussion and delate then centered on the price of 
silver and the amount of silver in the dollar. Senator Bcoth , 
of California, ihtroduced an important amendement regarding silver 
certificates which passed 49-15. The whole bill as amended 
passed the Senate February 15, 1878 by a vote of 48-21.13
The bill, as amended by the Senate, without the free coinage 
clause, proved unsatisfactory to the silver faction in the House. 
There were many protests but the belief was expressed by the 
advocates of silver that It would be well to take what they could 
get. At some time in the future they coula try to gain more 
ground. A vote on the bill was taken and it passed by 202 to 72. 
The bill was then sent to the President, who vetoed it February 
28, 1878. In his veto message President H yes expressed his 
objections in the following argument. He held that neither the 
interest of the people nor of the government woulc. be promoted by 
disparaging silver as one o: the two metals which furnished the 
coinageof the world. He favored silver coinage only when the 
intrinsic value of gold and silver would be as nearly equal as 
their relative cq, mercial values would permit. If a country was 
to be benefitted by silver coinage, he sale, it could be done only 
by the issue of silver dollars of full value, which would defraud 
no man. A currency worth less than it purports to be would
14In the end defraud both the creditor and the debtor.
In comparing the President’s objections with the provisions 
of the bill it will be found that they do not coincide with its 
provisions. He was in favor of silver coinage, but only with the 
condition that full value dollars be coined. It was shown time 
and again by Treasury officials that it would be a disadvantage 
to coin silver dollars of full value because of their si?,e. 
Furthermore, the dollar provided in the act would defraud no one, 
as the President feared, since it and its representative, the 
silver certificate with which the coin was interchangeable, was
:avowed by the bill to be receivable for all debts. In reality the 
main objection to the bill was that It contained restrictions as 
to the total amount of silver dollars coined, and this later 
proved to be its chief objection. President Hayes vetoed the 
bill, however, and It was passed over his veto on the same day by 
a vote of 196 to 73 in the House and 46 to 19 in the Senate.1*'
The act >rovid.ed for the monthlu purchase and coinage, by 
the government, of not less tnan $2,000,000 nor more than 
$4,000,000 of silver bullion anc- that the silver so coined should 
be legal-tender at their nominal value, for all debts and dues, 
public and private, except where otherwise stipulated, in the 
contract.
Just when the countries of the Latin Union, accustomed as 
they had been to silver, preferred not to give up gold, and had 
wholly ceased coining silver in 1878, the United States undertook 
the task of saving silver for the benefit of the silver producers.
7
8The price of silver fell steadily after 1876 and the ratio of 
silver to gold was also falling. Not a mint in Europe dared open 
its doors to silver, but the United States alone came forward in 
an attempt to uphold the value of silver.
The Bland act was put into effect Ira: ediately. Its operation 
may be studied from the chart on the following page. It can be 
seen from the chart that the circulation of silver dollars was 
relatively small, $65,000,000 was the highest point reached.
Besides bringing back the coinage of the silver dollar, the act 
also Introduced the silver certi icate into our currency. Section 
3 of the act provided that any holder of the coin autho ized by 
t lis act might deposit the same with the Treasury or any assistant 
Treasurer of the United States, in sums not less than ten dollars, 
and receive silver certificates. ‘I'hese certificates were receivable 
for customs, taxes, and all public dues. While they were not full 
legol tender, they were received equally with silver dollars 
because of their convenience and if refused they could readily be 
exchanged for silver dollars. It was only by the use of these 
silver certificates t iat any considerable amount of silver could 
be kept in circulation.
The Bland act produced an important effect upon our coinage 
system. The law itself clearly showed that while the silver 
dollar was not to supersede the gold dollar, Congress ap eared 
ready to adopt abimetalllc standard of silver and gold of equal 
value and purchasing power. The Bland act limited the amount of 
silver dollars coined each month, but it did not limit the total
&
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amount nor the period of time during which that coinage was to 
continue. The market value of the silver in the dollar, at the 
date of the passage of the act, was 93-| cents in goldj in November 
1873 it was about 86 cents. As the process of coining silver 
progressed, the silver dollars began piling up in the Treasury 
while the value of silver bullion declined. The Secretary of the 
Treasury had predicted that this condition would arise. In his 
report of 1878 he said*
"It was no doubt the intention of Congress to 
provide a coin in silver which would answer a multi­
tude of purposes of business life, without banishing 
from circulation the established gold coin of the 
country. To accomplish this it is lndispensible 
either that the silver coin be limited in amount or 
that its bullion value be equal to that of the gold 
dollar. If not its use will be limited to domestic 
purposes.”10
Silver coin coul not be exported, as gold could, at its 
commercial value in bullion, and if issued in excess of demands 
for domestic purposes, it would fall in market value and would 
finally become the sole coin of standard value. It is a well 
known fact that when two urrencies, both legal tender, are issued 
without limit the cheaper one, alone, will circulate. if, however, 
the issue of the cheaper money is limited to an amount demanded 
for circulation, it will not depreciate since its current use 
will keep it at par.
In a few years following the passage of the act of 1878, 
distrust of silver money was marked. °.ilver accumulated in the 
Treasury almost as fast as it came from the mints. Much of the 
silver put into circulation was in the form of silver certificates,
11
but as these certificates were exchangeable for gold, they were 
soon returned to the Treasury. Besides this, much of the silver 
put into circulation was finding its way back into the Treasury 
through the revenue channels being now receivable for customs, 
dues and taxes. Thus the only effect of the attem t on the part 
of the Treasury to circulate silver was to diminish the gold 
supply.
The total coinage of silver dollars under the Bland act 
amounted to $378,166,793. Since under that act the government 
was required to coin at least 2,000,000 silver dollars each month 
an£ since only a limited amount could be forced into circulation 
it can easily be seen what a burden was placed upon the Treasury.
From July 1, 1878 to the middle of 1880 almost all the silver
andcoined stayed in the treasury vaults,/) only a small number of 
certificates were out. During the fiscal year 1880 the amount 
of outstanding certificates was increased from $12,374,270 in 
July to $51,166,530 on June 20, 1881. This increase was duo in 
part to the demand for notes for general circulation, but chiefly 
to the operation of the departmental circular of September 18, 
1880, under which exchange in the sub-treasuries in the west and 
south payable in silver certificates was furnished free by the 
Department for deposits of gold coin with the assistant Treasurer 
in Hew York. This policy called for a transfer of funds to dis­
tant parts of the country. Under this policy a large amount of 
silver certificates had been paid out at the sub-treasuries, for 
the seasonal moving of crops.18 After 1881 the circulation of
12
certlf cates had Increased only slightly, but silver dollars were 
piling up In the Treasury vaults.
The advocates of silver claimed that this troublesome 
situation caused by the act was due to the Treasury policy* They 
argued that if the Treasury paid out silver, silver would be just 
as good money as gold. Pacts proved to the contrary, however, 
for just as soon as silver began accumulating in the Treasury, 
alarm was felt by the trade world. The Treasury officials held 
that if silver was paid out from the Treasury to meet the obliga­
tions of the government it would be a virtual confession that the 
gold In the Treasury was exhausted and that the silver standard 
was in force. T e Treasury was not lawfully forced to make 
payments in gold, but in coin at the discretion of the Secretary 
of the Treasury. But in order to maintain the government credit 
and tue confidence of the people, the Treasury Department was 
obliged to meet the government's obligations in gold and in gold 
only.
Resumption of Specie Payments
Under the act of 1875 the Secretary of the Treasury decided, 
as a preparation for resumption of specie pa; ments, to build up a 
gold reserve amounting to at least forty per-cent of the united 
States notes outstanding.
In his report of 1877 the Secretary advised the creation of 
a gold reserve of $120,000,000. This amount, he said, would be
sufficient to take care of the United States notes outstanding, 
the volume of which was to be reduced to $300,000,000 by a provi­
sion In the Resumption Act of 1875. Congress, however, in view 
of the strong popular feeling against contraction of currency, 
by an act aporoved May 31, 1878, forbade retirement of any United 
States notes after that date leaving the amount in circulation 
$346,681,016* Since the policy of the Treasury was to keep a
reserve of forty per-cent of the notes outstanding, the amount of
19the reserve was increased to $138,000,000,
At the close of the year 1877 the gold reserve amounted to 
$63,016,050, of which $15,000,000 was obtained by sale of four 
and a half per-cent bonds and $25000,000 by sale of four per-cent 
bonds, the remainder being surplus revenue. According to the 
Treasury policy this reserve m s too small and subsequently, on 
April 11, 1878, Secretary of the Treasuiy Sherman contracted with 
certain bankers In New York and London for the sale of $50,000,000 
of four and a half per-cent bonds. The bonds sold at a premium, 
bringing the net proceeds of $50,500,000 gold coin Into the 
reserve fund. Another issue of $5,500,000 four per-cent bonds 
brought the total bond sales for resumption purposes to 
$95,500,000. To this was added surplus revenue from time to time. 
The amount of gold coin held in the Treasury as a reserve on 
November 23, 1878 was $141,888,100. 20
In ntleipation of resumption, and in view of the fact that 
the redemption of United States notes was mandatory only at the 
office of the assistant Treasurer in New York City, it was deemed
Important by Secretary of the Treasury Sherman to secure the 
cooperation of the associated banka of that city In the ready 
collection of drafts on those banks and In the psyment of Treasury 
drafts held by them. A satisfactory arrangement was made by 
which all drafts on the Treasury held by them were to be paid to 
the clearing house at the office of the assistant Treasurer In 
United States notes? and, after January 1, 1879 Uhited States 
notes were to be received by the banks as coin. It was necessary 
to secure this cooperation with the New York banks so that United 
States notes would be accepted for payment as readily as gold, 
thus lessening the burden on the gold reserve. Everything was 
ready and the outcome looked bright for the resumption of specie 
payment. Secretary Sherman, in his financial report of 1878, 
made the follovdng comments:
”Every steep in those preparations for resumption 
has been accompanied with increased business and confi- 
deuce. The accumulation of coin, instead of increasing 
its price, as feared by many, has steadily reduced its 
premium on the market so that it is now merely nominal.
The present condition of our trade, industry, and 
commerce, our ample reserve, and the general confidence 
in our national financial condition seem to justify the 
oplonion that we are prepared to commence and maintain r 
resumption on and after the first day of January, 1879,
In order to establish confidence in the Treasury and to
clear up all doubt as to the meaning of "coin" as written in the
Resumption act, Secretary Sherman let it be known that the
Resumption act contemplated redemption in gold coin only.
On January 1, 1879 the gold reserve was 1133*808,800. The
Treasury was ready to resume specie payments. Confidence in
14
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United States notes was restored. Even before that date, in view 
of resumption, United States notes and gold coin were freely 
received and paid in private business as equivalents. That con­
fidence in United States notes was restored is shown clearly by 
the fact that from January 1, 1879 to November 1, 1879 the total 
number of notes presented for redemption was only $11,256,678. 
Aside from this very little gold was demanded on the coin 
liabilities of the government during the period. In the meantime 
coin was freely paid into the Treasury and gold bullion was 
deposited in assay offices and paid for in United States notes. 
DuriniS that period the gold reserve increased from $125,508,804 to 
$152,737,155. This increase of some thirty millions Included the 
eleven millions paid out in redemption of notes and proved further 
tlie degree of* confidence the people had in the Treasury policy*22
Gold Reserve Established By Law
The first step towards the creation of a gold reserve was 
made by Secretary of the Treasury McCulloch mhen ho pointed out 
the necessity for keeping a large gold balance in the Treasury 
in 1865-67. Two acts determined what the size of the reserve 
fund ought to be. The first was the act of 1875 which provided 
for tne resumption of specie payments, In section 3 of this act 
a reserve fund is tentatively provided for by authorizing the 
Secretary of the Treasury to use any surplus revenues in the 
Treasury foi future redemption of United States notes. In order
16
to further increase this reserve the Treasury resorted to the 
hond sales provided for in that act. The total ceaount of bonds 
sold amounted to $95,500,000 and since th© coin (gold) thus 
obtained could not be aoplied to current appropriations or for 
anything but redemption of United States notes, Secretary of the 
Treasury Sherman placed this gold in a separate fund designated 
as the gold reserve* He later suggested in his report to Congress 
a minimum gold reserve of $1,000,000.2S
In 1882 Congress had, in a round-about way, established a 
fund of $100,000,000 as a special and definite reserve for the 
redemption of "greenbacks”* This provision was embodied in a 
bill to amend the National Bank Act, then under consideration in 
the Senate. The reserve was established in an amendment to a 
section of the bill which related to gold certificates of deposit. 
The amendment read:
"That the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized 
and directed tolpeceive deposits of gold coin with the 
Treasurer or assistant treasurers of the United States 
in sums of not less than $20, and to issue certificates 
therefore in denominations of not less than $20 each 
corresponding with the denomination of United States 
notes* The coin deposited or representing the certlfl- 
catestof deposit shall be retained in the Treasury for 
the payment of same on demand* "24
Senator Aldrich amended this by adding a provision giving 
the Secretary of the Treasury power to suspend the issue of said 
certificates whenever amounts of gold coin and bullion in the 
Treasury available for redemption of United States notes should 
fall below $100,000,000. After prolonged discussion Senator 
Ingalls moved to change the word available in the foregoing
17
amendment for the word reserved. This was accepted, then the
provisions of the act were made mandatory by the change of the 
word shall for may*25
Much of the discussion over the onendment centered upon the 
advisability of a definitely fixed gold reserve. The sentiment 
of tiie advocates in favor of a definite reserve was expressed by 
Bayard, Senator from Delaware. He saidt
”There is at least one merit in the amendment of 
tiie Senator from Rhode Island, (meaning Aldrich,; and 
that is the recognition that there is such a thing in 
the Treasury as a reserve fund to protect the Treasury 
notesttn circulation.
’’There has been too much vagueness about the 
thing, too much uncertainty. . . .  I shall vote for 
the amendnent because it provides for a reserve fund 
beyond the power of the Secretary of the Treasury, 
that it is there by legal recognition, and responsible 
for greenback currency.”
The amendment passed and the Treasurer of the United States 
put the sum of $100,000,000 in gold coin in a separate fund 
reserved for the redemption of United States notes. Thus a gold 
reserve of $100,000,000 minimum became definitely established.’^6
Financial Situation, 1880-86
Nothing serious had occurred since the Secretaryfs last 
report to disturb the easy maintenance of s ecie payments. The 
only noticeable change in the Treasury funds was the gradual 
increase of silver coin caused by the coinage of silver dollars 
and the redemption of fractional silver coin. On November 1,
1880, almost a year after the resumption of specie payments began,
the reserve was still Intact, standing at $141,597,013. All 
requirements of the Resumption act had thus been complied with. 
Secretary of the Treasury Sherman expressed his confidence tint 
resumption could be maintained* He said, however, that if the 
entire amount of United States notes outstanding was to be main­
tained at par with coin, the reserve fund must be kept unimpaired. 
Ordinarily the greater convenience of notes would produce a 
demand for them rather than for coin, but if this proved not to 
be tbe case, an ample gold reserve would safeguard redemption.
In a supreme emergency, the power granted to the Secretary of the 
Treasury to sell bonds would supply any possible deficit in the 
reserve.**7
The legal-tender notes, being redeemable In gold, could not 
depreciate as long as the Treasury had the power and means of 
providing gold for their redemption. They, therefore, circulated 
freely, and were used not only for banking purposes but were 
absorbed In the every day exchanges as well because of their con­
venience as for the fact that they could be readily redeemed.
The silver dollars, coined under the Bland Act of 1878, stood on 
an entirely different basis. To begin with, It developed almost 
immediately after they were put Into circulation that the banks 
as well as the public did not want this coin for their every day 
use. Thus silver began to clog the channels of public revenue, 
which was the only outlet for the unpopular money. As early as 
1880 it was proved that It was almost Impossible to keep in cir­
culation more than thirty per-cent of the silver dollars coined.
19
The remainder had to be stored in the Treasury vaults. Up to 
September 30, 1881 over nlnty-eight million sliver dollars were 
coined, of vshich only thirty-two million were in circulation.
The only outlet for silver seemed to be through Bilver certificates 
which any holder of silver coin could obtain by demand. Every 
effort to put silver dollars into circulation was frustrated by 
the speedy return of the coin for certificates.
■While the total amount of silver dollari^in circulation had 
steadily increased, during the years 1880-85, the per-cent of 
silver dollars in circulation, to the total number coined, had 
drop ed from 30.8 per-cent in 1881 to 18.8 per-cent in 1885.28
In 1884 a commercial and financial crisis, the so-called 
"panic of 1884" swept the country. The silver surplus was 
steadily piling up in the Treasury. Foreign exchange was heavily 
against the United States, and the security markets were greatly 
affected. The crisis was brought on by the heavy liquidation of 
securities, and by the emb arras rune nt of several over-capitalized 
railway companies. This had been further aggravated, in February 
1883, by the ill-judged hint of local Treasury authorities that 
it might be advisable to force out silver through Treasury payments 
in New York.2&
The panic was confined chiefly to New York. The usual 
symptoms in other panics such as the hoarding of money, a general 
run upon savings banks, failure of banks, and suspension of 
American industry were not present in 1884. The Commercial and 
Financial Chronicle of New York commented as follows:
20
“Business in ail departments was suppressed and 
results as to volume of trade and prices were unsatis­
factory but all in all there was no real panic* The 
maimer in which business endured the money strain 
proved, that the liquidating process, during the two 
preceding years had been thorough* and that underneath 
the crumbling structure of speculation wag a firm 
foundation of genuine Increased wealth.
T e inflationists held that the fall in prices during this 
crisis was due to insufficient currency. On the othexfcand, the 
Treasury reports showed that, notwithstanding the gold shipments 
of the year 1884, the total supply of money in circulation in the 
United States had increased by $435,000,000, or fifty per-cent 
since the resumption of specie payments*^
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CHAPTER II
_ L
FINANCIAL SITUATION 1885-93
With the election of Cleveland in 1884 the country passed 
from the control of one party to that of another. The financial 
problems of the government were becoming more critical and it was 
evident that the new administration would have to face a difficult 
situation in dealing with the currency situation. Alarm was be­
ginning to be widely felt. There was doubt in the minds of many 
as to what Cleveland^ plans were. Under the Bland Act of 1878 the 
government had already minted 200,000,000 silver dollars. It had 
exerted every effort to force that vast amount of silver into cir­
culation. Much of it was actually put into circulation, but 
during and after the depression of 1884 it began to come back into 
the Treasury. Obligations of the government were being paid in 
these dollars, while gold was constantly being drawn from the 
Treasury by the use of both silver and greenbacks. In other words, 
the government was compelled to accept silver from its debtors 
while it had to pay gold to its creditors. Any other course would 
have ruined its credit since the Treasury had to keep gold and 
silver at par.
The sound money men, fearing that if the gold reserve once 
dropped below #100,000,000 specie payments would have to be sus­
pended, believed that legislation to stop the coinage of silver 
would alone arrest the danger. They brought pressure to bear on 
Cleveland and demanded that he come out in behalf of the gold 
standard. The supporters of silver were also making demands and 
were bringing equal pressure to bear upon Cleveland. Many excited 
conferences were held. On February 11, 1885, president-elect 
Cleveland received a letter, signed by ninty-eight Democrats of 
the House, expressing the fear that the banks and bondholders and 
those having fixed incomes were making a united effort to commit 
him and his administration against the continued coinage of the 
silver dollar. The hope was expressed in the letter that he would 
not do anything that would place his administration in opposition 
to the policy of the coinage of both gold and silver. The letter 
stated, also, that two-thirds of the Democrats in Congress had for 
six years been united in defense of silver and would continue to 
be so.1
As inauguration day approached the gold De mocrats, especially
the old leader Samuel J. Tilden, grew insistent that Cleveland
answer this letter and state publicly his determination to main-
tain the gold standard. To Cleveland such a declaration seemed
unnecessary as he had already committed himself to a sound money
policy. Eight days before his inauguration, however, he consented
2to sign a letter prepared for him by Manton Marble. In this 
letter of February 24, 1885, Cleveland stated that in his opinion 
a financial crisis was close at hand. He called attention to the 
fact that the vaults of the Treasury were heaped full of silver
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coins worth less intrinsically than eighty-five per-cent of the 
gold dollar prescribed by law as the unit of value. He added that 
the sum of gold in the Treasury available for the payment of gold 
obligations of the United States and for the redaption of United 
States notes was already being encroached upon. Going further, he 
made his first plea to Congress for the repeal of the Bland Act 
for the purchase and coinage of silver. He said that to maintain 
and to continue the use of both gold and silver at par, the pur­
chase and coinage of silver must be stopped.3
There was no direct reply made to Cleveland's letter, but a 
statement was published setting forth at length the views of the 
supporters of silver coinage. They argued that while it was true 
that the silver bullion in the silver dollar was worth eighty- 
five per-cent of the gold dollar, silver coins which were admitted 
to the same use as gold were equal in value to gold. They held 
that if the Secretary of the Treasury would pay out more silver 
and less gold the reserve would be safe. Since the matter was 
entirely under the president's control, no obligations existed 
which under our constitution were specifically payable in gold.
The belief was expressed that silver could not force gold out of 
circulation unless an amount equal to the entire volume of gold in 
circulation was forced upon the country by the Treasury,4
On February 23, 1885 the House committee on appropriations 
inserted in the sundry Civil Appropriation bill a clause to suspend 
the coinage of silver from July 1, 1885 to June 30, 1886,5 To 
assist the plan of suspension, Randall, chairman of the committee,
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submitted a resolution to suspend the rules so as to discharge the 
committee of the whole from the further consideration of the bill 
and to limit the debate to four hours. This time was to be spent 
in discussing only the clauses relating to the suspension of silver 
coinage and the world*s industrial Exposition. The resolution was 
defeated 118 to 15£. The vote was accepted as representing the 
views of a majority of the house on the suspension of silver 
coinage.
Commenting on the failure to suspend the silver coinage, the 
New York Chronicle said that business would be seriously affected. 
This would be the natural result of the uncertainty of values 
created by the continued coinage of depreciating silver dollars.
It was only Cleveland’s firm stand on the currency quest!>n that 
put heart into frightened business men and cont nued trade and 
production at the normal rate.
There was every reason to anticipate that sound and conserva­
tive counsels would prevail during the administration because 
Cleveland had expressed himself plainly on the leading issues of 
the day, while his cabinet was made up of some of the ablest men 
in political life. Judging from the House vote on the suspension 
of silver coinage, Cleveland’s problem was to secure the support 
of his party for his sound money policy.
Condition of the Treasury
When Secretary Manning to k over the Treasury in 1885, he had
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a real task before him. The situation was more serious than it 
appeared to be on the surface. Secretary McCulloch, preceding 
Manning, had permitted his balance to increase during the last 
month of his term. He made no bond calls against the standing 
surplus accumulating in the gold reserve. The reserve fund, 
therefore, was growing, but the policy of postponing the debt pay-
Q
ment could be carried on indefinitely.
In spite of the efforts of the outgoing administration to 
keep the gold reserve up, it had began to drop in the last months 
of President Arthur*s term. It went down from $141,000,000 on 
January 1, 1885 to $185,000,000 on April 1, 1835. Cleveland and 
Manning recognized this threat against the reserve and began 
adopting vigorous measures to protect it. They permitted no bond 
redemptions, allowing the revenue to accumulate in the Treasury, 
and they used greenbacks whenever possible for disbursements, 
Instead of using gold or silver certificates, ^hey also made 
arrangement with the New York Clearing House to assist them in 
keeping the existing stock of gold in the Treasury. The results 
surpassed all expectations. At the end of the first year the
9reserve had been built up from 125 millions to 151 millions.
During this period the gold reserve had fallen to its lowest 
level since the resumption of specie payments. As A. s. Hewitt 
later pointed out in the House that the country had really stood 
close to disaster in the early days of Cleveland»s administration. 
He stated that to his personal knowledge, three great New York 
banks had secretly accumulated more than $25,000,000 in gold in
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anticipation of possible disaster. The crash did not come, he 
said, "thanks to Grover Cleveland and that superb management of 
the Treasury which has made the name of Daniel Manning famous 
throughout the financial world
Since the fourth of March, the Treasury Department had been 
admirably conducted. Manning had reversed the flow of gold and 
greatly strengthened national credit. Before March 4, 1885 the 
New fork customs receipts were practically all gold and its equiv­
alents, but after that date the proportion paid in silver certifi­
cates reached nearly 42 per-cent of the whole. Under the policy of 
Cleveland and Manning the per-cent of duties paid in silver certif­
icates was cut from 41 1/3 in April 1885 to only 9|$ in September 
1885, After the first year of the new administration the gold 
reserve was sound but the risks of the silver coinage act were 
still present. Until Congress repealed the Bland Act no revival 
in business, except within very narrow limits, was to be antici­
pated. As long as compulsory coinage was kept up, confidence in 
the stability of our currency could not be permanently restored.1^ 
The very success of the new Treasury policy angered the advo­
cates of free coinage, for they would have liked nothing better 
than to see the nation forced upon a silver basis, Congress had no 
sooner met in December, 1885, than there occurred a series of 
attacks on the President and Secretary of the Treasury. The whole 
line of criticism was directed against the policy of maintaining a 
large gold reserve and the administration’s refusal to pay out 
silver. Senator James B. Beck of Kentucky and Senator Eustis of
Mississippi, particularly denounced the policy of the administration
of lacking up so much money in the Treasury. They expressed the
opinion that it was not necessary for the United States to retain
a reserve for the maintenance of its credit and the payment of its
cash obligations. They argued that the government could just as
well pay its obligations in silver and by doing so it could relieve
the Treasury of its "burden”, as the gold men called the silver in
the Treasury. The defenders of the government policy argued that
an ample reserve was needed and absolutely necessary to maintain
the government credit. They held that any increase in the reserve
was a point gained in maintaining the credit of the nation, In
answer to this argument the opposition contended that the resources
of the country were so ample and our credit so sound that there
could be no possibility of a demand upon the Treasury which could 
12not be met. In the House, Bland, Warner of Ohio, Weaver of Iowa, 
and Bryan of Nebraska led a group of Democrats and western Republi­
cans who accused Cleveland and Manning of working in the interest 
of the eastern bankers and the creditor classes. They denounced 
the policy of maintaining a large surplus In the Treasury as a plan 
to secure the favor of Wall Street and the banks. They contended 
that the money which was derived from taxes obtained from a hard 
working people was held in the Treasury for the benefit of the 
bondholder. The whole Idea of the reserve was wrong, since the 
bondholders were not thinking of the public welfare but merely of 
the annual interest in gold they received from the government bonds 
in their possession.13
Cleveland continued his sound money policy in spite of all 
criticism. In his second annual message he sharply challenged 
Congress for being responsible for the silver surplus, piling up 
in the Treasury. He said in effect that every fair and legal 
effort had been made by the Treasury department to distribute 
silver currency among the people. The withdrawal of United States 
Treasury notes of small denominations and the issuing of small 
silver certificates had been resorted to in an endeavor to accomp­
lish this result, in obedience to the will and sentiment of the 
representatives of the people in Congress. In spite of this 
effort, however, the silver was steadily accumulating in the 
Treasury* As further expressing the same views of his first mes­
sage, In his second message he again recomuended the repeal of 
silver purchase and silver coinage. He salcls
nI again urge suspension on the grounds contained 
in my former recommendation, reenforced by a significant 
increase of gold exportation during the last year, and 
for the further reason that the more this currency is 
distributed among the people the greater becomes our 
duty to protect it from disaster. We have abundance 
for our needs and there seems but little propriety in 
building vaults to store such currency when the only 
pretence for its coinage is the necessity of its use 
by the people as a circulating medium.
In his report of 1886 Manning assailed the silver act from 
all angles. He saids
nI have labored to promote the circulation of 
silver with unremitting energy. I have pressed its 
circulation at a constant expense to the Treasury 
when other forms of lawful money could have been cir­
culated without such costs. Except our own, no mint 
in the world which gives free coinage of gold now 
coins full legal tender silver. We alone heap up the 
load. Meanwhile what good hove eight years of it 
done the silver owners?"!5
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The fact was that with some eight years of compulsory purchase 
and coinage of silver the price had declined. Furthermore, after 
eight years of free coinage of full legal-tender silver dollars, 
the people of the United States had used only 8,045,338 of the 
total number coined. Congress had already, since 187Q, required 
the coinage of some 215,000,000 silver dollars. In 1835 gold coin 
still comprised QQ% of the metallic circulation of the United 
States,16
On March 23, 1387 Fairchild replaced Manning as head of the 
Treasury Department, Fairchild, as well as Manning, recognized 
the danger that existed in the compulsory coinage of silver. He 
put forth his utmost efforts in the hope of obtaining the repeal 
of the silver coinage clause.
Secretary of Treasury Fairchild, in his report of 1887, 
brought out a new plan to solve the silver problem. His scheme 
was to establish a $5,000,000 reserve of silver dollars and as 
long as this reserve was maintained the purchase and coinage of 
silver was to be suspended.17 This recommendation to Congress, as 
well as many others, was not concurred in because of the strong 
sentiment in Congress against restrictions on silver purchases and 
coinage.
From the middle of the year 1836 for the remaining months of 
Cleveland’s term the country enjoyed a short respite from monetary 
disturbances. The gold reserve remained well over $100,000,000, 
being over 158 million on July 1, 1386j $168,000,000 July 1, 1887; 
and close to or over $200,000,000 from then to March 1, 1889.13
S3
These large surpluses were not maintained without criticism however, 
for the administration was constantly being assailed by members of 
Congress. Morrison led the attack in the House, and Vest the 
attack in the Senate. The whole attack was centered upon the 
policy of a large reserve which the administration had accumulated 
during the past year. The opponents of the administration all 
favored the plan of applying the large reserve or at least the sum 
in excess of 100 million to the payment of the outstanding debt. 
Weaver of Iowa said:
nWhat moral or legal right has the Secretary of 
the Treasury to hoard in the vaults millions, yea 
hundreds of millions, of money that has been drawn 
from the people by painful taxation when interest 
bearing debts are payable and due according to law.
It amounts to a misappropr i. at ion of public funus and 
to the boldest kind of absolute tyranny
It was still further argued that it was not necessary to keep 
any considerable reserve even for the purpose of redemption. It 
was also argued that nobody wanted greenbacks redeemed, that gold 
goes ten times for greenbacks where greenbacks go once for coin. 
Furthermore they held that the greenback was redeemable in coin 
but not necessarily in gold coin, and that it was impossible for 
silver ana paper to fall below the level of gold since the volume 
In circulation was so limited.
In answer to these arguments it was shown that the gold 
reserve was not idle but was, on the contrary, the busiest and most 
useful fund in the Treasury. This gold supplied the country with
t
a circulating medium three and a half times its own size. It was 
also argued that the balance in the Treasury was not as large as
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pictured since many drafts and checks were always outstanding 
against it. On July 14, 1886 Morrison brought before the House, 
from the Ways and Means committee, a report on the excessive sur­
pluses held in the Treasury. The report contained a joint resolu­
tion requiring the Secretary of Treasury to employ all its money 
over and above $100,000,000 in retiring government bonds. The 
resolution passed the House by a vote of 207 to 67, and it was 
next amended and passed In the Senate by a vote of 42 to 20. The 
amended resolution as it passed the House provided for a 100 
million reserve with a 20 million working balance, but the Secre­
tary of the Treasury was required to retire government bonds with 
all gold in the reserve above the smaller amount. Cleveland pre­
vented it from taking affect by a pocket veto.^1 In vetoing the 
resolution Cleveland said:
"It is not a proved because I believe it to be 
unnecessary and because I am by no means convinced 
that its mere passage and approval at this time may 
not endanger and embar’ass the successful and useful 
operation of the Treasury department and impair the 
confidence which the people should have in the_^ 
management of the finances of the government."''2
The Republicans regained the control of the national adminis­
tration, and in 1889 William Windom became the Secretary of the 
Treasury. In the campaign of 1388 the Republicans had denounced 
Cleveland1s opposition to silver coinage as an attempt to demone­
tize silver. They declared themselves in favor of the equal use 
of gold and silver as money. A clause in their platform read:
"The Republican party Is in favor of the use of 
both gold and silver as money, and condemns the policy 
of the Democratic administration in its effort to
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demonetize silver.*S5
When Harrison became president the supporters of silver began 
an insistent demand on the party to redeem its pledge, and give 
the country free and unlimited coinage of silver. In November 
1889 a silver convention met in St. Louis. Thirty states and 
territories were represented. Fiery speeches against the capital­
ists were made and a platform was drawn up. The platform, which *
Bland of Missouri wrote, demanded that the fifty-first Congress 
open the Federal mints to the free coinage of silver, and that the 
money so coined be made legal tender for all debts.
This was Harrison*s first administration and he had to think 
of re-election. The country was sharply divided on the question 
and he dared not commit himself to either side. He declared him­
self in favor of the use of silver as money, but he also spoke 
against this policy if carried too far. In his first annual message 
he said that he had always been an advocate of the use of silver 
in our currency and that since we were large producers of that
OA,metal we should not discredit it. In his second message to 
Congress he suggested an international council to consider the 
question of the free use of silver as money and the adoption of 
bimetallism as a desired policy . ^
With the president thus apparently committed in favor of their 
theories the advocates of silver in Congress renewed their fight 
for unlimited coinage of silver. Many different propositions were 
brought forward. While some favored Secretary Windom’s plan of 
issuing Treasury notes against deposits of silver bullion, the
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notes being redeemable in equal value of bullion on demand, others 
insisted on free coinage and vowed they would accept nothing else, 
A bill embodying Secretary Windom*s plan was finally agreed to in 
the House, The bill was amended in the Senate by the substitution 
of a free coinage measure. This measure oassed the Senate on June 
17, 1890 by a vote of 43 to 24, but the House refused to concur.^® 
The Democrats supplied the majority in favor of the measure, the 
vote being 28 Democrats and 15 Republicans. A long fight followed 
and the free coinage men finally accepted a compromise measure, 
the Sherman Silver Act, which was passed by both Houses and 
a proved by President Harrison July 14, 1890.^  The act was a 
Republican measure and passed the House by strict party vote. The 
count being 122 Republicans for and 90 Democrats against. The 
sectional vote is as follows:
Northeast Yea Nay Not voting
Connecticut V 2 1 1
Delaware 0 1 0
Maine 1 0 2
Massachusetts 5 1 6
New Hampshire 0 O' £
New Jersey 4 1 2
New York il 4 18
Pennsylvania 15 4 8
Rhode Island 1 0 1
Vermont 1 0 1
Total 40 12 41
Middle West
Illinois 12 4 4
Indiana 2 a 2
Iowa 8 l 2
Kansas 6 0 1
Michigan 6 i 4
Minnesota 3 0 2
Montana 1 0 0
Nebraska 3 0 0
North Dakota 0 0 1
Ohio 10 2 9
South Dakota 2 0 0
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Yea Nay Not voting
¥/isconsin 6 2 1
Total 59 19 26
Far West
California 3 2 1
Colorado 1 ■ 0 0
Nevada 1 0 0
Oregon 1 0 0
Washington 1 0 0
Total 7 2 1
Border
Kentucky 2 6 3
Maryland 3 1 2
Missouri 3 5 6
Tennessee 1 5 • 5
West Virginia 2 1 1
Total 11 18 17
South
Alabama 1 4 3
Arkansas 1 4 0
Florida 0 2 0
Georgia 0 4 6
Louisiana 1 3 2
Mississippi 0 6 1
North Carolina 1 2 6
South Carolina 0 5 2
Texas 0 7 4
Virginia 1 3 6
Total 5 40 30
Totals
Northeast 40 12 41
Middle West 59 19 26
Far West 7 1 2
Border 11 18 17
South •5 40 30
Total 122 90 116
Of the number counted as not voting , 112 were
pairea, leaving only four whose vote could not be
counted. Adding the pairs makesi a total vote of 178
yeas to 146 nays .28
The essential provisions of the Sherman .Act were that the
government was required toi purchase, monthly, at least 4,500,000
ounces of silver, at market price, to be paid for in legal-tender
notes redeemable in coin; and the coinage of silver, provided for
In the Bland Act of 1878, was to be repealed after July 1, 1891.
Under the operation of the act the price of silver advanced 
immediately after the passage of the law. On July 14, 1890 the 
price of silver was $1.08 per ounce; and by September 3, 1890 it 
reached its highest point, $1.21. After September the price 
dropped rapidly until by November 1, 1891 it was quoted as only 
S.96 per ounce, making the bullion value In the dollar but 74l  
cents. The quick rise in price was due primarily to speculation* ^ 
The Sherman law brought about another peculiar result: imports of 
foreign silver from May 1 to November 1, 1890, exceeded exports by 
$7,750,000 while for the corresponding period a year earlier 
exports exceeded imports by $7,860,000, a total difference of 
$15,610,000. In other words the Sherman act provided for the pur­
chase of much more silver yearly than our total annual production 
of the metal.31 President Harrison stressed the same point in his 
third annual message to Congress. He showed that the government 
was buying and putting aside annually 54,000,000 ounces of silver, 
which was 6,640,000 more than our domestic product available for 
coinage. In spite of this showing, however, the President reoom- 
mended that the Sherman, la?; be given further trial.0
In his report of 1891, Secretary of the Treasury Foster re­
ported a loss of $67,946,786 in gold by net exports during the fis­
cal year 1891 and a gain of silver by excessive Imports amounting 
to $2,745,365. The tot. 1 amount of gold exported from February to 
August 1891 w'as over seventy million.33 The chief cause for these 
heavy gold exports was the financial stringency both here and. 
abroad. Up to midsummer of 1890 the year had been one of more
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than average business activity, but after that the outlook was not 
so promising. Agriculture was in an unsatisfactory condition, 
overtrading and unhealthful expansion was apparent everywhere.
The banks of the country were unduly extended and the flow of 
money to this country from Europe ceased. Vast amounts of American 
securities held abroad were forced on the New York markets in pre­
paration for an expected collapse. Aside from this there existed 
a monetary stringency in England and Europe as well, caused by 
failures of the Panama Canal Company, the Baring Brother’s Banking 
House, and the French Cop er Syndicate. As a result of these 
failures a large amount of gold was needed at once and they turned 
to the United States for it. The financial needs of Russia and 
the accumulation of gold by Austria-Hungary, with a view to the 
resumption of specie payments caused a premium to be 'aid for gold 
exports and was an important cause of its outflow. Distrust of 
our monetary legislation and the fear on the part of Europe that 
we were drifting towards a silver basis* also had an important 
influence upon gold exports.3'-1
To help relieve the stringency at home the Secretary of the 
Treasury increased his purchase of United States bonds to such an 
extent as to almost entirely exhaust the available surplus In the 
Treasury. From July 19 to November 1, 1390, over $99,000,000 were 
disbursed in payment for United States bonds and interest in an 
attempt to supply the country with a larger ctrculatIng medium.
It was apparent, however, that while the relief afforded was 
timely, the unfavorable conditions were caused to a greater degree
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by a want of confidence than by a lack of circulating medium.
Throughout the period of currency difficulties the gold 
reserve, although pared down considerably, remained above the 
$100,000,000 mark. It had dropped, however, from over 190 million 
in 1890 to a little over U 0  million in 18918.So
In spite of the fact that the government was already buying 
more silver yearly than the/country produced, the silver advocates 
still clamored for free coinage. They were not satisfied wita the 
Sherman Act of 1890 and argued that it did not go far enough. A 
number of free coinage measures were introduced in both the House 
and Senate in the fifty-first Congress but the bills died in 
committee. The silver faction was persistent, however, and kept 
up their fight for free silver coinage. Finally on January 14,
1891 they succeeded in passing a free coinage bill in the Senate 
by a vote of 39 to 27. This bill was later killed in a House com­
mittee. In the Senate debate on the bill the measure was supported 
on the ground that there was insufficient currency to transact the 
business of the nation. They argued that the per-capita circulation 
In the United States was only half that of France or England, and 
that the country’s ills were due to this shortage in the circulation 
medium.
In answer to the argument that the government was already 
buying up the nation’s total silver product, the silverites cried 
that it was more money in circulation that they wanted, not more 
silver in the United States Treasury. The sound money men met this 
argument by showing that the circulating medium of the nation was
41
gradually Increasing, They argued that instead of aiding the 
financial problem a free coinage act would merely flood the country 
with a currency that would rapidly depreciate and lead to 
disaster.*^
—--
s
43
1. A pleton’s Annual Encyclopedia, IX, 785.
2. Ibid., IX, 783-84.
5. McElroy, Cleveland, New York, 1923, I, 108-9.
4. Appleton’s Annual Encyclopedia, IX, 783.
5. Eouse Re orts, 48th Congress, 2nd Session, pt. 5, 2627.
6. Congressional Record, 48th Congress, 2nd Session, pt. 3,
2209-11.
7. Commercial and Financial Chronicle, New York, 1885, XL, 252, 280.
8. Ibid., XL, 280.
9. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury 1885, Washington, 1885,
I, pp. XXXI-XXXII,
10. Congressional Record, 49th Congress, 1st Session, pt. 7,
6922-23.
11. Commercial and Financial Chronicle, XLI, 370.
12. Congressional Record, 49th Congress, 1st Session, pt, 1, 708-11.
13. Ibid., pt. 3, 3000-1.
14. Messages and Papers of the ^residents, New York, XI, 5097.
15. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury 1886, I, 51.
16. Ibid., 1885, I, pp. XVII, XVIII.
17. Ibid., 1887, I
18. Ibid., 1889, I, 33.
19. Congressional Record, 49th Congress, 1st Session, pt. 2, 1704.
20. Ibid., 49th Congress, 1st Session, pt. 2, 6932-46, 7742, 7811,
21. Messages and Papers of the Presidents, XII, 5475-76.
22. Ibid., VII , 5628.
23. Nevlns, G. Cleveland, New York, 1932, 465.
£4. Messages and Papers of the Presidents, XII, 5475-76.
5. Ibid., VIII, 5628.
44
26. Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 1st Session, pt. 7, 6173.
27. Ibid., 51st Congress, 1st Session, pt. 3, 7264,
23. Ibid., 51st Congress, 1st Session, pt. 8, 7226.
29. See ap endix for entire act.
30. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury 1891, I, p, XXXI.
31. Ibid., 1890, I, p. XLIX.
32. Messages and Papers of the Presidents, VIII, 5628.
33. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1891, I, p. XXXI.
34. Report of Comptroller of Currency, Washington, 1892, 4.
35. Ibid., 1891, I, 9-12.
36. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury 1892, I
37. Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 2nd Session, pts. 1-2, 12, 
16, 67, 238, 1303-23.
CHAPTER III
THE GOLD RESERVE, 1893-1397
Immediately after his election in 1892, Grover Cleveland set 
to work upon the problems which were facing the administration.
The western constituencies were demanding free silver, while in 
the east public opinion was urging the repeal of the Sherman Silver 
law. To attempt repeal might disrupt his party. The increase of 
the public debt by issuing bonds to maintain a standard of value 
would but add to the number of the silver support.rs. The 
situation was becoming a serious ore. The surplus which Cleveland 
had so carefully guarded in his first administration was gone. In 
the east there was a growing fear that sllv r would eventually dis­
place gold in th Treasury. In the west, there was great dissatis­
faction with the Sherman law, and some of the silver supporters 
were determined to press their demand for free silver. European 
investors were thinking of ways and means to secure gold for the 
remaining American securities held there. E ports of domestic 
products were decreasing and imports were Increasing. The future 
of the currency and finances of the country depended on the action 
taken by the new administration.1
Cleveland certainly needed competent assistants and wise 
counsel during the coming years. John G. Carlisle, of Kentucky, 
was chosen Secretary of the Treasury. He was wisely chosen as he
................—  ■ ' —  ' .................—  ..........w....
had an admirable record in supporting Cleveland’s policy and 
principles during his speakership in the House in previous years.
The gol reserve had rapidly dwindled in the years of 
Harrison’s administration. This was due to the president’s policy 
of redeeming government bonds at high premium in order to increase 
the circulating medium of the country. On March 7, 1893 when 
Carlisle took office the reserve was only slightly above the 100 
million mark* &y arrangements with western banks it was then in­
creased until, on April 1, 1893, it amounted to $106,891,000. Out 
the ’93 panic was on, shipment of gold to Europe incre sed, and 
prices were falling rapidly. Gold payments for customs and internal 
revenue dues fell off sharply ana by April 18 the reserve nad lost 
its previous gains. The anxiety in the business world was great 
when the reserve fell to only $100,000,000. It was commonly 
believed that the Secretary of the Treasury would soon cease making 
golo payments. In many newspaper, appeared statements to the 
effect that the United States Treasury officials were contemplating 
redemption of Government bonds in silver. To offset these reports 
Carlisle made a public statement on April 20, 1893 that he had 
paid gold in the past ana would continue to do so as long as he 
had gold in the treasury lawfully available for that purpose. He 
said that no order had been made to stop gold payments nor had 
anyone been authorized to say that such an order would be issued.
He further stated that it was the purpose of the government to 
preserve its credit unimpaired and to maintain the parity of gold
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and silver by all lawful means.
The result of Carlisle’s public statement,was far from being 
satisfactory for it confined an unfortunate expression, indicating 
that he would pay gold as long as he had gold lawfully available.
The question still remained, could the 100 million dollars of the 
gold reserve be lawfully useo for redemption of Treasury notes.
The Secretary of the Treasury had not answered this question and 
the public opinion was divided as to whether he meant that only 
the gold not included in the reserve would be used in redeeming 
Treasury notes in 1890,^ On April 22, notwithstanding the most 
strenuous efforts of the Treasury Department, the gold reserve fell 
below .100,000,000,^ Clevel .nd finally yielded to the advice of 
the financiers and came to the rescue of theTreasury. He authorised 
a statement on April 25 which emphatically contradicted all news­
paper reports concerning the policy of the Treasury Department.
He stated that the redemption of government obligations in anything 
but gold had never been considered* He insisted that the adminls- 
tration was harmonious in its determination to maintain public 
credit, to keep faith with the public and to preserve the parity 
between gold and silver. He further statec. that, with the confi­
dence and cooperation of the people, the threatened dangers would 
be averted, and he promised legislati n for a better anc sounder 
f nancial plan. 1 Cleveland’s impressive declaration considerably 
subdued the panicky feeling in the country. The public was 
satisfied that the administration was harmorjous in its determination
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to maintain the parity between gold and silver. The change in
confidence was apparent in Europe as well as in rica, and this
was reflected in foreign exchange markets as well as on Wall
Street. The feature of the week of June 24, 1893 was the ar ival
in New York of a shipment of #5 *0,000 in gold from London. The
event was chiefly significant in show ng an improvement In the
condition of our foreign exchange. The announcement of Clevel nd*s
polic,. had undoubtedly tended, in some degree, to revive foreign
confidence in American investments and led to a small but decisive
increase in. the sale of our securities in Europe. There was as
yet, however, no assurance that the flow of gol( Into this coun ry
6would be continued.
In the meantime there occurred the panic of July, 1893.
Gold was being hoarded and money was becoming scarce. The Baring 
failure in London, as h d been previously pointea out, considerably 
aggravated the monetary stringency abroad. The silver purchase 
act of 1890 was inflating the cur ency by about 50 millions 
annually and was bringing about a arlced disappearance of gold 
from circulation. At the same time the Populist free silver 
demands aroused fears in the East of a Western dominance in Con­
gress and the consequent destruction of the gol standard. Many 
business firms began to i sue scrip in an effort to supply cir­
culating medium. Ahe Secretary of the Treasury authorized a 
a further issue of national bank notes for the same purpose.
Between March 30 and November 30, 1893 m re than 134,000,000 in
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such notes were issued. Ihl s addition to the curre cy was of 
little aid, however, because it immediately went into hiding.7 
In his December report the Comptroller of Currency expressed the 
belief that it was not a lack of currency in circulation which 
had brought on the trouble. No additional amount of money would 
have given relief. As long as confidence was lacking and credit 
declining, hoarding would continue and additional issues would 
give little, if any, actual relief.8
Repeal of the Sherman Law
The financial situation was rapidly becoming critical and a 
breakdown of the gold standard was threatened. Conservative Demo­
crats realized that to relieve the situation some change had to be 
made in the Sherman law. All attempts to repeal the law previous 
to 1893 had failed. The rapidly Increasing strength of the silver 
faction in Congress had by 1893 become a real menace to the presi­
dent’s policy. Cleveland and Carlisle both understo d that the 
fight for repeal would be a bitter one, but financial developments 
were making it impossible to avoid the issue. When the Sherman 
bill became a law in 1890 not a single Democrat had voted for the 
measure, but in 1393 the growth of the Populist party had under­
mined the party and many Democrats objected to its repeal unless 
a free coinage bill was substituted for it. Cleveland was urged 
to call a special session of Congress for the repeal of the
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Sherman act. Banks, trust companies and other corporations began 
distributing circulars demanding repeal anc many chambers of 
commerce voted resolutions asking for the same action. The 
silver supporters were likewise preparing for the struggle. They 
were not greatly impressed with the arguments for repeal. To 
them the whole demand was merely a plot of Wall Street and the 
capitalists of the east. They sent a host of speakers over the 
country to stir the people against the repeal of the silver act. 
Colorado, the center of thejsilver producing region, was naturally 
the most aggressive in this ba tie for silver. Their opponents 
persisted in their efforts to get a special sesdon but Cleveland 
still delayed action. The party had been elected on a platform 
promise of tariff reform and to repeal the Sherman lav/ might dis­
rupt the party. Another reason for the delay was the opposition 
in C ngress. Such influential men as Voorhees of Indiana, chair­
man of the finance committee in the Senate, refused to take a 
decided stand. Cleveland stated, that it was because he could not 
count on the support of Voorhees that he delayed in calling 
Congress in special session. Volney T. ^alott, an Indianapolis 
banker, and a supporter of the Cleveland policy, assured Cleveland 
that Voorhees could be persuaded into favoring repeal. He said 
that the senator would certainly listen to the importunities 
coming to him from his Democratic friends in banking and business 
circles in Indiana. Ex-senator T. F. Bayard and Secretary of 
State Greshem, both friends of Voorhees, also assumed Cleveland
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Qthat Voorhees could be lined up behind the administration.
The effects of the panic gradually spread westward and in 
many districts, where free silver sentiment was strong, public 
opinion was changing to a more reasonable attitude on the silver 
question. Many banks werejf arced to close their do rs and 
financial stringency which followed undermined the determination 
of those who had clamored for inflation.
Cleveland’s proclamation calling for a special session on 
August 7, 1895 was issued June 50. distrust and apprehension 
c ncerning the financial situation, wrote Cleveland in his proc­
lamation, had already caused great loss and damage, and the 
crisis was largely the result of the o, eration of the Sherman 
law.10
immediately after his proclamation calling a special session 
Cleveland was secretly taken away, aboard a yacht, for a serious 
operation. Secrecy was necessary because Vice-president 
Stevenson was a silver man, and with the possibility of his being
' . i
President the announcement of Cleveland^ condition would 
undoubtedly have caused a new financial crisis, fortunately the 
operation 7ms successful and Cleveland’s health was completely 
restored.
Cleveland opened the special session with a message that 
was at once tactful and moderate, h© began by briefly reviewing 
the painful business situation caused by the sudden distrust as 
to our monetary standard, and laid the blame for the whole
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situation on our unwise silver purchase legislation. He showed 
that since the passage of the Gherman law the government had 
bought more than 5147,000,000 worth of silver and that many of 
the notes issued for its purchase had been redeemed in gold.
Between May 1, 1892 and July 15, 1893 the notes issued in payment 
of silver bullion amounted to a little more than $54,000,000 and 
during the same per od about #49,000,000 was paid by the Treasury 
in gold to redeem these notes, '^hus the prospect of the complete 
substitution of silver for gol seemed to be impending. The 
redemption of notes in gold had already encroached upon the gold 
reserve. Thus we had made the depletion of our gold easy, and 
had apparently tempted other nations to add to their stock of 
gold. This, he said, was shown by the fact that for theyear ending 
•June 30, 1883, gold exports had exceeded imports by more than 87| 
millions. In closing, Cleveland declared that it was apparent 
that the operation of the silver purchase law was leading in the 
direction of a single standard and the payment of all government 
obligations in depreciated silver. He had called Congress, there­
fore, to obtain the repeal of the existing law for the purchase of 
11silver.
°n August 8, Senator Hill introduced the first bill to repeal 
certain sections of the act of 1890, and the bill was referred to 
the committee on finance. On August 11, ^ilson introduced a 
repeal bill in the H o u s e . T h e n  followed a prolonged conflict 
between the advocates of the gold standard and their opponents.
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In the House, many lengthy speeches marked the debate. Wilson, 
Cochran, Reed, Coombs and others carried the attack for the sound 
money supporters. Bryan of Nebraska and Bailey of Texas led the 
attack on the other side for the silver cause. The chief points 
made by these speakers were that demonetization favors the monied 
class, that silver was a lawful money of the constitution and we 
had no right to take it from the people, and that gold alone could 
not furnish a sufficient supply of money to meet the necessities 
of commerce, Bailey quoted the statement of Alexander Hamilton 
that to annul the use of either gold or silver is to abridge the 
quantity of the circulating m e d i u m . H e  further pointed out 
that there always would be difficulty in adjusting and maintaining 
a given parity between gold and silver and he advocated free 
coinage of silver as an aid in fixing the relative values of the 
two metals. He finally proposed to Wilson and those acting with 
him that they join the silver bloc in permanently establishing 
the equality of gold and silver and bind themselves to keep the 
gold and silver dollar at the same intrinsic value.
Bryan gave a flowing three hour speech, championing his 
cause. His arguments followed the familiar lines. He contended 
that there was neither gold enough nor silver enough to form the 
worldfs supply of specie. He maintained that if the United States 
would keep its courage, it could preserve the parity of gold and 
silver at 16 to 1. He said that repeal of the Sherman law points 
to the burial of silver and to a single gold standard.
BIt leads Irresistibly to a universal gold monometallism:
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to a realm over whose door is written, Abandon all 
hope, all ye who enter here.”
He said further that,
"If bimetallism Is impossible then we must make up our 
minds to a silver standard or to the abandonment of 
both gold and silver. Let us suppose that the worst 
that has been prophesied by our opponents, namely, 
that we would be upon a silver standard if we attempted 
the free coinage of both gold and silver at any ratio.
Let us suppose that all our gold, goes to Europe and we 
have only silver. Silver would not be inconvenient to 
use because a silver certificate is just as convenient 
to handle as a gold certificate and the silver itself 
need not be handled, except where necessary for change.
If, following out the supposition, our gold goes abroad 
Europe will have more money with which to buy our ex­
ports, cotton and wheat, cattle and hogs."
He said that instead of adopting a. gold standard in order to
trade with Europe why not reverse the proposition and say that
Europe must resume the use of silver in order to trade with us.
"But why adopt either gold or silver alone? ^hy not adopt 
both and trade with both gold using and silver using 
countries?"
In closing Bryan said,
"The last platform pledges us to the use of both 
metals as standarqtaoney and to the free coinage of 
both metals at a fixed ratio. Does anyone believe 
that Mr. Cleveland c uld have been elected President 
upon a platform declaring in favor of the uncondition­
al repeal of the Sherman law?
"The President has recommended unconditional re­
peal. It is not sufficient to say that he is honest, 
so were the mothers who, with misguided zeal, threw 
their children into the Ganges. The question is not, 
is he honest, but Is he right? He won the confidence 
of the tollers of this country because he taught that 
•public office is a public trustr, and because he con­
vinced them of his courage and his sincerity. But are 
they willing to say, in the language of Job, •Though 
he slay me, yet will I trust him.’
"Whence comes this irresistable demand for un-
conditional repeal? Not from the workshop and farm, 
not from the workingmen of this country, who create 
its wealth in the time o1 peace and protect its flag 
in the time of war, but from the middlemen, from what 
are termed the business interests, and largely from 
that class which can force Congress to let it issue 
money at a pecuniary profit to itself if silver is 
abandoned. The President has been deceived. He can 
no more judge the wishes of a great mass of our people 
by expressions of these men than he c.n measure the 
ocean’s silent depths by the foam upon its waves.
"Today the democratic party stands between two 
great forces each inviting its supports. On the one 
side stand the corporate interests of the nation, its 
moneyed institutions, its aggregations of wealth and 
capital, imperious, arrogant, compassionless . . .
"On the other side stands that outnumbered throng 
which gave a name to the democratic party and for 
which it has assumed to speak. Work-worn and dust- 
begrimed, they make their sad appeal. . . . They can­
not pay for loyalty except with their suffrages, and 
can only punish betrayal with their condemnation. . .
"This army, vast and daily vaster growing, begs 
the party to be its champion in the present conflict."14
The chief argument used by the soutk money men centered on
one ideas The currency famine, which the country was suffering
from, was the result of distrust in our monetary system, caused
by the increase of paper money and th export of gold. "Remove
the cause, the Sherman Act, and you will quiet the people’s fears
and with returning confidence the currency will again come into
its ordinary channels."10
"The Sherman law has failed to accomplish the results 
expected by those who formed it", said Wilson. Going further, 
he said that it was expectec^fehat when the United States poured 
over $4,000,000 legal tender Treasury notes, every month, into 
the channels of trade, there would be a wholesome expansion of 
our currency. But, contended ?/ilson, Instead of expanding it has
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worked a harmful contraction of the currency, *or every million
of Treasury notes thus poured, out more than a million of gold
has disappeared or gone into hiding. He argued that the repeal
bill would bring about the desired parity between gold and silver!6
In answer to the plea for bimetallism, Wilson said:
"We are all bimetallists except the free coinage 
silver men who are monometaliists, all for silver."
He also argued that there should be no fear of a gold standard,
since we have always been on a gold standard and on a single gold
standard since 1873$ and that the repeal bill does not demonetize
1 7a single silver dollar.
in closing the debate for the supporters of repeal, Reed
gave tie following two reasons why he favored repeal:
"First it seems to me to be deeply settled in 
the public mind from causes which can be eas ly under­
stood, that the Sherman law is the cause of the un­
reasonable hoarding of currency throughout this 
country. The popular mind is so filled with the Idea 
that the existence of the purchasing clause of the 
Sherman law is an element of disorder, that if we 
remove it we shall do more to restore confidence 
than anything we could do In the world.
"Second, when th#lme comes It will assist us 
on the upward path to the next period of prosperity 
and progress."18
Cleveland was pleased with the victory, which was even 
greater than anticipated. The supporters of the Sherman Act we e 
beaten with the decisive majority of 131. The Democratic vote 
was 138 yeas and 78 nays and the Re ublican 101 yeas and 22 nays. 
All the Populists voted in the negative, eight votes!9 The bill 
was then referred to the committee on finance in the Senate.
The v o te  by s e c t io n s  i s  a s  f o l l o w s :
Northeast Yea Nay
Connecticut 4 0
Delaware 1 0
Maine 4 0
Massachusetts IS 0
New Haapiire £ 0
New Jersey S 0
New York S3 0
Pennsylvania £8 2
Rhode Island £ 0
Vermont £ 0
Total 97 —’FT&
Middle West 
fllinois 16 6
Indiana 13 0
Iowa 9 £
Kansas 0 8
Michigan 10 1
Minnesota 6 1
Montana 0 1
Nebraska 1 5
North Dakota 1 0
Ohio 19 1
South Dakota 0 2
Wisconsin 9 0
Total 84 27
Far Yfest 
California £ 5
Colorado 0 2
Idaho 0 1
Nevada 0 1
Oregon 0 2
Washington 1 1
Total 3 12
Border
Kentucky 9 2
Maryland 6 0
Missouri 3 12
Tennessee 4 6
West Virginia 3 0
Total 25 20
South Yea Nay
Alabama 3 6
Arkansas 1 5
Florida 1 1
Georgia 7 4
Louisiana 3 £
Mississippi 1 6
North Carolina 2 7
South Carolina 1 5
Texas 3 9
Virginia 8 2
Total 30 47
Totals
Northeast 97 2
Middle West 84 27
Far West 3 12
Border £5 £0
South 30 47
Total 239 108
The Senate, meanwhile, had also been working on a repeal 
bill, introduced by the committee on finance August 18. That 
bill contained a declaratory paragraph in favor of bimetallism, 
but otherwise it was a sound repeal bill. When the Senate commit­
tee received the House bill they amended it before reporting it 
to the Senate. The amendment was In the nature of a substitute, 
the co mittee having substituted the Senate bill for the u mse 
bill.20
The fight in the Senate was not so easily nor so quickly won 
as in the House, •‘■he free silver . orces were confident of a 
majority and they fully expected to kill the bill. The east and 
the west were clearly divided. On one side were Stoart, Teller, 
Pepper, Jones, Vest, Morgan, and Gorman fighting for the Sherman 
act, while Morrill, noar, Voorhees, and McPherson carried the
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attack against the act. The greatest argument used by the silver 
supporters, which was merely a matter of interpretation, was that 
repealing the purchase clause of the ^herman Act was not in line 
with the platform adopted by the Democrats in Chicago, ^une 1, 
1892. They argued that the platform pledged the use of both 
silver and gold as standard money o^the country; and to the coin­
age of both metals without discrimination. Senator Morgan was 
particularly loud in concerning the repeal till because in counter­
acted the pledge made to the people in his party’s platform. He 
said that there was nothing in the bill except the death warrant 
for silver as a money m e t a l . M p t  arguments on this point, as 
well as those of his collegues, had very little foundation. T,e 
very first sentence of the section of the platform referred to 
opens: **We denounce the Republican legislation known as the 
Sherman Act of 1890 as a cowardly make-shift."2^
The Democratic party had pledged to repeal the Sherman Act,
.
and, furthermore, the repeal bill contained nothing as to the dis­
use of silver as money. Many compromises were proposed, but 
Cleveland would accept nothing but unconditional repeal. The 
western senators stood firm against repeal but those of the south 
and southwest were ready to yield. A vote was finally taken on 
October 50 and Cleveland won by a vote of 43 to 3 2 . The bill 
was then sent back to the House for reconsideration. On November 
1 the House concurred by a vote of 194 to 94 and the bill was 
signed by Cleveland the same day.2^
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Condition of the Treasury After Repeal
Contrary to expectations, the repeal of the Sherman Act did 
little to lessen the burdens of the Treasury. It did not relieve 
the Treasury of its obligations nor die it restore confidence in 
the ability of the government to maintain the gold stanuard, On 
the day the silver-purchase repeal bill passed the Senate the gold 
reserve stood at 184,000,000. Business and financial leaders grew 
restive as the reserve continued to fall and they urged Carlisle 
to replenish the reserve by bond sales.
Very little gold was being received from dues to the Govern­
ment and it was therefore impossible to increase the reserve with­
out resorting to the issue of bonds. The Secretary of the Treasury 
could issue bonds under the authority conferred by the Act of 
January 14, 1875 known as the resumption act. rart of the third 
section of this act to provide for the resumption of specie pay­
ments, which refers to bond issues, is as follows:
”. . .  and to enable the Secretary of the Treasury 
to prepare and provide for the redemption in this act 
authorized or required, he is authorized to use any sur­
plus revenues, from time to time, in the Treasury not 
otherwise appropriated, and to issue, sell and dispose 
of, at not less than par, in coin, either of the des­
cription of bonds of the United States described in the 
Act of Congress a proved July fourteenth, eighteen 
hundred and seventy, entitled *An Act to authorize the 
refunding of the national debt’, with like qualities, 
privileges, and exemptions, to the extent necessary to 
carry this act into full effect, and to use the proceeds 
thereof for the purposes aforesaid.”25
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The act of July 14, 1870, referred to for a description of 
the bonds authorized to be issued, provides:
•That the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby 
authorized to issue, in a sum or sums not exceeding 
in the aggregate two hundred million dollars, coupon 
or registeredbonds of the United States, in such 
form as he may prescribe, and of denominati ns of 
fifty dollars, or sooe multiple of that Siam, redeem­
able in coin of the present standard value, at the 
pleasure of the United States, after ten years from the 
date of their issue, and bearing interest, payable 
semi-annually in such coin, at the rate of five per 
cent per annum; also a sum cr sums not exceeding in 
the aggregate three hundred million dollars of like 
bonds, the same in all respects, but payable at the 
pleasure of the United States, after fifteen years 
from the date of their issue, and bearing Interest 
at the rate of four and a half per cent per annum; 
and also a sum or sums not exceeding in t e aggregate 
one thousand million dollars of like bonds, the same 
in all respects, but payable, at the pleasure of the 
United States, after thirty ears from th^date of 
their issue, and bearing interest at the rate of four 
per cent per annum. . . .n
In his annual report of 1893 Carlisle asked Congress for 
authority to sell bonds bearing a lover rate of interest than 
provided for in the act of 1875, anc. running for a shorter term 
of years?6
On January 8, 1394 a bill was introduced in the house to 
authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to borrow money, but was 
not reported out of the committee on ways ano means.
On January 17, 1394 the gold reserve was, after raany fluctua­
tions, reduced to 169,757,000, It was impossible to procure gold 
to replenish the reserve without resorting to the sale of bonds. 
CongreS' had refused the Secretary of the Treasury the authority 
to issue low rate bonds so, under the provisions of the 1875 act,
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$50,000,000 o f  5%, ten year bonds were issued andsold for 
$58,660,917.65 in gola.^® The first bond sale brought the gold 
reserve to over 107 millions on March 6, 1894, the highest point 
reached since March 25, 1893. The actual increase in gold in the 
Treasury was only 38 millions. This small increase came about 
from the fact that the subscribers to these bonds, in many cases, 
obtained the gold they paid for the bonds from the Treasury in
oqexchange for United States notes.
The first bond sale did not pass without comment. The com­
mercial and financial centers were greatly pleased with the outcome 
and praised Carlisle for saving the reserve. The opponents of the 
administration in Congress were loud in condensing the transaction. 
They claimed that the Secretary of the Treasury had no authority 
to sell these bonds. Peffer of Kansas claimed that there was no 
need to sell these bonds. He said the Secretary of the Treasury 
called attention to the fact that the high premium on Government 
bonds at that time made him hesitate about issuing bones under 
any circumstance and not until the pressure became so great that 
the Governments credit, at the Secretary's opinion, was at staxe, 
and that the Treasury was in danger did he ask for authority to 
issue bonds. When the authority was refused him he proceeded 
without the authority to save the credit of the Government.
"There is no such emergency," argued Peffer, " . . .  how can 
he speak of peril when there is nearly $140,000,000 of silver coin 
and bullion in theTreasury besides the gold. There is a great
interest in the country that is demanding the issue of these 
bonds", said Peffer, "and: humiliating as it is to make the state­
ment, our Government is in practical partnership with that 
interest. I refer to the banking interest the brokers and the 
speculators, and the men who gamble on the people's credit, That 
is the interest that is clamoring forthese bonds; and that is the 
Interest which must be protected at all hazards though the rest 
of the country may go to the dogs."
Peffer based his argument that the Secretary did not need 
gold to redeem Treasury notes on section three of the Sherman Law, 
which provides:
"That the Secretary of the Treasury shall each 
month coin 2,000,000 ounces of the silver bullion pur- 
c ased under the provisions of this act into standard 
silver dollars until the first day of July 1891, and 
after that time he shall coin of the silver bullion 
purchased under the provisions of this act as much as 
may be necessary to provide for redemption of the 
Treasury notes herein provided for."01
The silver supporters claimed that under these provisions the 
Secretary of the Treasury had no right to redeem Treasury notes 
in gold. The Secretary of the Treasury had a dlfferant interpre­
tation of the act, however. He deemed it necessary to continue 
paying gold for he believed that refusal to do so would indicate 
to the public that the United States Government was on a silver 
basis.
The reserve did not long remain intact, but it continued to 
fall in spite of all efforts to preserve it. On August 7, 1894 
it dropped to a new low of 52 millions. After t at date it was
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slowly replenished by voluntary exchanges of gold coin for United 
States notes by banks and by small gold payments from the tariff 
receipts, until it reached 61 million on November 14, 1894. In 
the meantime public credit continued to decline for there were 
frequent withdrawals of gold fr m the Treasury by individuals 
and Institutions win presented united States notes for redemption, 
This gold was not exported but hoarded and thus steadily reduced 
the circulation. Also foreign exchanges were almost constantly 
at or near a rate which made it more profitable to export gold 
than to purchase bills of exchange, and conse uently these with­
drawals continued to threaten the reserve.32
It soon became evident that a second bond issue to maintain 
the public credit was inevitable. On November 14 this bond issue 
of $50,000,000 was offered to the public. One bid was received
*7 * 2for the whole sum and the sale netted $58,538,500. The transac­
tion did not stop withdrawals of gold for in December, 1894, they 
totaled over 32 millions. During January, 1895, withdrawals 
amounted to over 45 millions. This drain upon the reserve con­
tinued until on February 8, 189S the reserve stood at $41,000,000. 
'iluch of the amount withdrawn was not demanded for exports, but was 
withdrawn for hoarding. This fact seems tofurther establish the
conclusion that the people were becoming alarmed over the critical
34condition of the Treasury*
The situation now became so grave that Cleveland called the 
attent on of Congress to the subject by a special message January
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28, 1895, In the message he stated that more than 172 millions 
in gold, had been withdrawn in the first ten months, and 69 millions 
more than one-third of the total, during thefollowlng two months.
He also brought out the fact that the silver certificates upon 
which this gold had been withdrawn were still outstanding and 
were available for use in repeating the process from time to time. 
He said:
"The financial events of the past year suggest 
facts and conditions which should certainly arrest 
attention. . .
"An adequage gold reserve is in all circumstances 
absolutely essential to the upholding of our public 
credit and to the maintenance of our high national 
character. . . .
"While I’m not unfriendly to silver, and while I 
desire to see it recognized to such an extent as is 
consistent with financial safety and the preservation 
of national honor and credit, I am not willing to see 
gold entirely banished from our currency and finances.
To avert such a consequence I believe thorough and 
radical remedial legislation should be promptly passed.
I therefore beg the Congress to give the subject 
immediate attention."
In closing his message Cleveland asked Congress for authorization 
of bond sales on discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, and 
that the United States legal-tender notes be cancelled as redeemed 
and thus destroy the endless chain. He also asked, in the same 
message, t at the payment of all Import duties be required to be 
be made in gold to assure a constant flow of gold into the 
Treasury,35 Congress again failed to act on these recommendations 
and Cleveland and Carlisle began hurriedly planning for a third 
bond issue,
;
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The first question to be settled was whether the bonds should 
be issued for public subscription. Any other method would be 
certain to draw severe criticism. Cleveland and Carlisle were 
reluctant to try any other method, but eastern financial leaders 
advised them that with so little time available, public subscrip­
tion would be hopeless. The withdrawals of gold were to nearly 
$4,000,000 on January 30. At this rate in a few weeks more the
■i f •-Govern; ent would be forced to default on its gold obligations.
On that same day, January 30, Carlisle sent Assistant Secretary 
of the Treasury Curtis to Newr York to see what could be done as 
to the sale of bonds for gold. Curtis conferred with several 
bankers, with foreign connections, and reported back tout in his 
opinion, from what he had learned, that bonds could not be sold.36
In the evening of the same day several newspapers published 
statements to the effect that the Government was taking, measures 
to obtain more gold. These reports had an i . ediate effect. On 
the 31st of January withdrawals dropped to $£,359,928, and on 
February 2 withdrawals of gold dropped to $1,454,865. After the 
announcement by the newspapers that negotiations had been completed; 
which, however, was not true, the withdrawals practically ceased.
In fact, about $1,800,000 in gold was returned to the Treasury.
The delay, however, in making public the official announceaient 
that negotiations were completed, created so;ae uneasiness and
'7i7gold withdrawals began to rise again.
In the meantime, Cleveland and Carlisle were hard at work
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planning the proposed bond sale. The New York bankers were ready, 
having been preparing to purchase the bonds since Curtis* visit 
to New iork.58 On February 8, 1895, Carlisle opened negotiations 
with a syndicate composed of August Belmont anc Company of New 
York, Rothschild and O0ns of London, J. P. Morgan ana Company of 
New York and J. S. Morgan and Company of London. The plan as to 
purchase 3,500,000 ounces of gold, at $17.80441 per ounce, payable 
in thirty year, four per cent bonus. One ounce of standard gold 
was worth $18.60465, and the difference between that sum and the 
contract price represented the premium received by the Government 
on the bonds, making the price at which the bonds were sold 
$104.4946. At this price they yielded to the syndicate 3.75 per 
cent per annum. The specifications of the contract were that not 
less than one-half of the gold was to be obtained abroad, also 
that the parties of the contract agreed as far as lay in their 
power to extend their financial influence against withdrawals of 
gold from the Treasury, pending the completion of the contract.
With this contract the syndicate also obta ned the option to tahe 
such bonds as might be offered for sale on or before October 1,
1895.39
The contract contained the following clause:
"The Secretary of the Treasury reserves the 
right within ten days from the date hereof, in case 
he shall receive authority from Congress therefor, to 
substitute any bonds of the United States bearing 3 
per cent interest, of whicn the principle and interest 
shall be specifically payable in United States gold 
coin of the present weight and fineness for the bonds
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herein alluded to; such 3 per cent bonds to be accepted 
by the parties of the second part at Pgr, i. e., at 
$18.60465 per ounce of standard gold.1,40
Before the contract was signed, Cleveland sent a message to 
Congress in order that it might be offeree the earliest possible 
opportunity to take action on the above clause. In his message 
he gave Congress the terms of the contract and told Congress that 
if it would agree to substitute 3 per cent gold bonds for 4 per 
cent bonds under the privilege reserved, the saving in interest 
to the government would be $539,159 annually or $16,174,770 at 
the maturity of the bonds. 1
In support of Cleveland’s message Wilson of West Virginia 
reported to the house, from the Committee on Ways and Means, a 
joint resolution authorizing the issue of $65,116,275 gold 3 per 
cent bonds. The views of the minority on this resolution, upported 
by Bryan and Justin R. Whiting were expressed as follows;
"The issue of bonds of any kind is only needed 
to replenish the gold reservej and the gold reserve 
only needs replenishing because the Secretary of the 
Treasury redeems United States notes and Treasury 
notes in thdfcind of coin selected by the note holder.
The note holder has no legal right to choose the coin 
in which the obligation shall be redeemed but has been 
permitted to exercise that right by a policy inaugurat­
ed by the Treasury Department at or soon after the 
date of resumption . . . We are not willing, by auth- 
oriz ag bonds for the purchase of gold, to pledge the 
Government to a policy which discriminates aga nst 
silver as a stancard money and recognizes gold as the 
only money of ultimate redemption. Do long as the 
bondholder is allowed to ehoose the coin in which he 
is to be paid, so long will it be futile to attempt 
to maintain the gold reserve."
They further held that gold secured by Issue of bonds is at
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once drawn out. by those who are interested in having more bonds 
issued, and that public debt is increased to the detriment of the 
taxpayer aid for the benefit of those who desire a safe investment 
for surplus funds. They held that the only remedy is forlthe Sec­
retary of the Treasury to redeem notes in silver when it is more 
convenient|to do so. They declared they would never authorize 
issue of bonds payable specifically in gold. The minority were 
also loud in condemning the price at which the bonds would be sold 
to a syndicate which was made up partly of foreign investors. 2 
The resolution was then referred to the Committee of the 
Whole and was brought on for debate on the following day. Cleve­
land was bitterly criticized for his actions by the opposition.
It was pointed out that Francis L. Stetson, counsel for Morgan, 
who helped draw up the gold contract, was a former partner of 
President Cleveland, The President was therefore charged with 
conspiring with his financial friends to defraud the Government.
In his fight against the bill Hopkins of Illinois contended 
that, due to the low price at which the bonds were to be sold, 
the syndicate w uld make $9,5000,000, in round numbers, when the 
contract was signed, and, $18,000,000 at the expiration of the 
period the bonds had to run. In answer to the argument that by 
authorizing the issue of 3 per cent gold bonds the Government 
could save $16,000,000, Hopkins said:
"When the President sent that message to this 
House and undertook to unload this contract upon Con­
gress he knew that a majority of the Senate of the 
United States favored free and unlimited coinage of
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silver, iie m e w  that never c uld a gold bond bill go 
tor ugh that body, to say nothing of the sentiment in 
this House. Then why die he send that message here?
He sent it for the purpose of misleading the country.
. , . He made a contract with his financial friends, 
giving t-iera tadenoraous profits that I have Inc tested, 
and he desired by that message to mislead the public 
and get the approval of Congress on the Idea th t 
116,000,000 of interest would be save- by giving such 
approval. . . . When President Cleveland penned that 
message an; sent it to Congress it was not for patriot­
ic, but political purposes.*
BWhat is this contract?* asks Bryan in his speech 
on the; question of 3 per cent gold bonds, *It is a 
contract mad* by the Executive of a great nation with 
the representatives of foreign mosey loaners. It is 
a contract made with men who are desirous of changing 
the financial policy of this country. They recogni e 
by their action that the United States has a right to 
pay coin obligations in eIt xer gold or silver ant they 
come to us with the insolent proposition, *w® will 
give you 116,000,000 if the United States will change 
its financial policy to suit us.1 “ever before has 
such bribe been offered to our people by a foreign 
syndicate, and we ought to so act that such an act 
will never be offered again.
*We cannot afford to put ourselves in the'hands of 
the Rothschilds, who hold mortgages on moat of the 
thrones of Europe. , . • There is another objection 
to this contract. It provides for the private sale of 
coin bonds running thirty years at 104* which ought to 
be worth 119 in the open market, an which could have 
been sold at public auctIon for $115 without the 
least effort* Why this sacrifice of the interest of 
the United States? The Govern .ent’s credit was not in 
danger; the bonds of the United States were selling 
in the market every day at a regular premium. , , .
We are told that we can avoid the sale of coin bonds 
atH04| by authorising 3 per cent gol bonds. What a 
privilege! Why, it is less than three months since 
ten year coin bonds were sold by the President at a 
premium which reduced th* rate of interest to less than 
3 per cent,
*Has the credit of the country fallen so ouch?
Nothing has occurred within three months, except the 
President’s message, to injure the credit of the coun­
try.
A vote was then ta :en and the bill was defeated by a vote of
167 to 120.45 The gold contract, held up pending Congressional 
action, was then signed and put Into effect. $65,315,400 worth 
of bonds were issued to the syndicate and some $65,000,000 In gold 
was received. No gold was withdrawn from the Treasury to be used 
In payment of the bonds as had been done in the two previous 
cases. No gold was withdrawn from the Treasury to be used in pay 
until after the contract was completed. The last delivery of gold 
under the contract was made June £4, 1895, but the syndicate con­
tinued to make deposits of gold in exchange for United States 
notes until September 11, 1895. The amount so deposited was over 
$16,000,000. ' Soon after the contract was completed gold exports 
began again to deplete the reserve. On August 1, 18S5 the gold 
reserve stood at over 107 millions but by September 14 it was 
reduced to $96,000,000 and it was falling at the rate of a million 
dollars a day. Morgan publicly announced that the syndicate would 
continue to aid the Government. By October withdrawals had almost 
ceased, but in November gold exports increased again and by Decem­
ber the situ tion became dangerous with the reserve at only 
$63,000,000, The gale withdrawals for December alon^amounted to 
$15,481,347. The heavy withdrawals were due to manipulations in 
foreign exchanges. While the contract was In process of execution 
the parties to the syndicate in this country drew bills of exchange 
on their associates and others abroad and used them, tosupply 
foreign exchange for the market in New York, thereby preventing 
withdrawals of gold from the Treasury for export. In this way the
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reserve was protected as long as the bills could be furnished, but 
finally, when conditions had arisen under which it was not possible 
to draw more bills of exchange without sending the gold abroad to 
meet them at maturity, gold exports began again. In his annual 
message to Congress, December 2, 1895, Cleveland again appealed to 
that body.
In this message Cleveland gave a resume of the legislation 
relating to silver coinage. He called the attention of Congress 
to tire gold demands upon the Treasury and to the serious nature of 
the difficulties encountered by the Government in its efforts to 
maintain the gold reserve under the existing system of financial 
legislation. He said that those difficulties could be removed by 
the retirement and cancellation of the greenbacks and the outstand­
ing Treasury notes issued under the act of 1890, and he asked 
Congress for this authority. To Insure the cancellation of those 
notes and also to provide a way by which gold might be added to 
our currency in lieu of them, he asked that the Secretary of the 
Treasury be given the authority to sell gold bonds, the gold to 
be used for this purpose.47 Congress took no action on his recom­
mendations.
Meanwhile the situi'on in the Treasury was again growing 
serious. The large and rapid withdrawals occasioned by the 
scarcity of foreign exchange in our market soon excited feelings 
of alarm and distrust in financial circles at home and abroad, 
which made the situation extremely critical. On December 20, 1895
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Cleveland sent another special message to Congress urging lousedirte 
legislative action upon the subject. In this message Cleveland 
3a id*
"In ay last annual message the evils of our 
present financial system were plainly pointed out and 
the causes and means of depeletlon of Government gold 
were explained. . * . The contingency then feared has 
reached us, and the withdrawals ofgold since the 
co ouni cat on referred to and others that appear in­
evitable threaten such a depletion in our Government 
gold reserve as brings us face to face to the neces­
sity of further action for its protection* This con­
dition is intensified by the prevalence in certain 
quarters of sudden and unusual apprehensions and tim­
idity In bus'ness circles. . . .
"The real sensible cure for our recurring troubles 
can only be effected by a complete change in our finan­
cial system."
In closing he asked C ngress not to recess before it had done 
something to relieve the emergency.4'1'
Ho legislation, however, was enaete ., and the financial 
situation, instead of improving, was constantly growing more 
serious. The reserve continued to fall and in order to avert 
disaster Cleveland and Carlisle began planning a fourth bond 
issue. The newspapers quickly reported that another sale of bon' s 
to the same syndicate that had previously dealt with the Government 
was being negotiated. Cleveland*s opponents In Congress were 
furious when they learned of the proposed action. Many bills 
limiting or prohibiting the issuance of bonds were introduced in 
both houses but all were killed in committee* to which they were 
referred.
On January 6, 1396 Carlisle issued a circular calling for
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subscriptions for $100,000,000 In United States four per cent, 
thirty year bonds. This circular was furnished to the public 
press and printed in most of the newspapers of the country. The 
bids were made public February 5, 1896 and numbered 4,641, the 
aggregate subscriptions amounting to $688,000,000. Upon examina­
tion of the bias before the awards were made it was found that 
some of them had been made in bad faith by irresponsible parties 
who had no gold nor any means offcrocuring it, and these bids were 
thrown out. The bids of some others were suspected not to have 
been made in good faith, but the circumstances actually known at 
that time did not warrant their rejection. Among the latter 
class was a bid signed "William Graves and Associates", of ^ew 
York, for $4,500,000 which was first accepted and later thrown 
out. One bid from J. P. Morgan and Company of New York was for 
the whole 100,000,000 at the price of $110.68. After accepting 
all higher bids, including the bid of Graves and Associates, and 
a few small ones which were also afterwards forfeited for non­
payment, there remained the sum of $25,179,850 which was allotted 
to J. P. Morgan and Company. When Graves and other small bidders 
failed to comply with their bids the aggregate amount of their 
bids, $4,736,000, was awarded to J. P. Morgan and Company, t :ey 
being the next highest bidder. This matter was made the subject 
of a resolution of inquiry in the House. Carlisle was notified 
on February £6 that a House resolution provided for a committee to 
investigate the alleged conduct of the Secretary of the Treasury
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in refusing to deliver to William Graves $4,500,000 in the bonds 
of the United States and awarding said bonds to J. P. Morgan and 
Company, notwithstanding that Graves was alleged to have tendered 
the Secretary the amount of the bid for the bonds in gold at the 
subtreasury in New Y o r k . O n  harch 7, 1896 in response to this 
request received from Nelson Dingley Jr., Chairman of the Co mittee 
on Ways and Means, Carlisle sent him a letter containing a full 
account of the transaction. In this letter Carlisle clearly 
showed by duplicates of letters and telegrams Involved in the 
Graves transaction that, as far as the Treasury Department was 
able to ascertain, Graves had no associates and that he was wholly 
unable to comply with its terms. Carlisle stated that neither 
Graves or anyone else tendered any gold whatever in payment for 
the bonds, or any part of them, at the subtreasury in New York, 
or elsewhere. He said, also, that Graves had twice asked for an 
extension of time. Payments on the bids were due February 15,
1896 and on that day instead of receiving any gold from Graves, 
he received a telegram from him in which Graves abandoned his 
original bid of $115.2391, and prop sed to take the bonds at 
$113.50. Between February 15 and February 19 various letters and 
telegrams were received from Graves. No notice was taken of those 
telegrams and letters for the reason tnat, according to the terms 
of the sale, the time for receiving bids expired February 15, 1896. 
In explaining why the bonds which were refused Graves were 
allotted to Morgan and Company, Carlisle held that Graves had
defaulted* He also said that if this bid of Graves’ had been 
rejected at the beginning the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury 
to award the bonds to the next highest responsible bidder would 
have been perfectly c l e a r . A f t e r w a r d s  Graves instituted mandamus 
proceedings against the Secretary of the Treasury in the Supreme 
Court of the District of Columbia. In answer to the writ Carlisle 
presented a complete affidavit in which he exhibited all facts and 
correspondence relating to the subject. The text of this affi­
davit was much the same as his answer to the House Inquiry of 
February 26, 1896. The mandamus petition was promptly withdrawn
by the plaintiff upon the filing of Carlisle’s answer.51
YsThile the bond sale was being negotiated the reserve continued 
to fall. It reached a new low of $44,500,000 on February 10,
1896, but by March 31, 1896, the gola procured from the bond sale, 
which netted $111,166,000, brought the reserve to $128,713,709.
No considerable variation in the reserve took place during 
April when gold exports almost ceased but the export of gold was 
again resumed on May 1. ^here was, after May 1, 1896, an almost 
daily decline in the reserve until on July 23, It stood at 
$89,669,975. The bankers of the principal cities then joined 
together in a movement for relief. The result of this was that 
the banks and financial institutions deposited gold with the 
Treasury Department in exchange for paper currency and restored 
tne reserve to $110,782,403 by August 4, 1896. After the discon­
tinuance of this aid from the banks the reserve began again its
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downward trend during the remainder of the month. On September 1 
the reserve stood just above the 100 million mark. Foreign 
exchange shifted again in the latter part of August ana during 
September a favorable balance in foreign exchanges checked the 
outflow of gold and set in motion a rapid current in the opposite 
direction. By September 30, 1896, the reserve stood at over 184 
millions.L2
During the month of October redemptions of United States 
notes and Treasury certificates in gold were unusually heavy and 
the reserve declined to $114,000,000 by November 5, 1896, The 
tide was turning, however, and the country was at last showing 
increasing confidence in the ability of the Treasury to maintain 
the reserve. Diminished demands for redemption after November 
1896 permitted an almost daily gain in gold. The reserve continued 
on its upward trend during the early months of the year 1897. On 
April 28, 1897 it had reached a total of $155,639,773,53
in addition to the gold procured through the sale of bonds, 
the Treasury had secured $115,245,173 since May 7, 1893, in 
exchange for United States notes, Treasury notes of 1890, and 
other forms of currency. The total amount of gold received during 
Cleveland’s second term was $408,716,967.34
Although Cleveland had maintained the credit ofthe country 
and had more than once restored the reserve, he was bitterly 
attacked for the methods he used in doing so. By a resolution of 
May 7, 1896, in the Senate, the Finance Committee was ordered to
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investigate Cleveland’s bone, sales of the years 1894, 1895 and 
1896. The resolution called for a report on the effect the bond 
sales had on credit and on the general business of the United 
States. Ahe committee was also ordered to inquire into the dis­
position of bonds purchased by certain persons in New York; to 
whom they were sold, and what profit was made.
On May 12 the finance committee a pointed the following sub­
committee to conduct the investigation:
I sham G. Harris, Tennessee, Chairman.
George G. Vest, Missouri.
Ed. C. Walthall, Mississippi.
John P. Jones, Nevada.
0. H. Platt, Connecticut.
The first meeting of this subcommittee was held in Washington May 
22, 1396. Carlisle and Morgan were summoned to attend the investi­
gation. Morgan, who as then in London, cabled that he would 
return at once, and Carlisle set to work immediately preparing a 
report for the committee.
On June 1, 1396 Carlisle submitted his report showing all 
material facts and circumstances connected with the bond sales.
He explained at length the monetary condition prior to each sale.
He gave complete reports on each bond sale; to whom they were sold 
and at what price, and defended the issuance of the bonds under 
the Resumption Act of January 14, 1875. In answer to the question 
as to the effect bond sales had on credit ana business of the
United States Carlisle said1 in closing his report:
"I have the honor to say that, in my opinion, the 
sales were necessary/for the preservation oi the credit 
of the Government and the security of the business 
interests of the people, and that they, in fact, 
accomplished those results. It is not possible to 
state in this communication all the facts upon which 
this opinion is based, but it may be said, In general, 
that the effect of each sale was to restore confidence, 
for the time being at least, in the power and purpose 
of the Government to maintain its own credit, to pre­
serve the parity of our coins and the value of our cur­
rency, and to check the return of our securities in large 
amounts from other countries for sale on the markets 
here. It can not be certainly known what would have 
been the consequences to the credit and business int­
erests of the people if the executive authorities had 
made on effort to maintain the gold reserve held for 
the redemption of our national currency and had per­
mitted that fund, to become entirely exhausted; but it 
is believed that such a policy would have subjected all 
classes of pur citizens to great pecuniary loss and 
distress.
At their June 12 meeting the investigation co .mittee, after 
hearing Carlisle's first report, decided to call the Secretary 
and have him examined. The date for the next meeting, at which 
Carlisle was to be questioned, was set for Jone 15. After so e 
discussion, the committee decided to proceed to New York for
further Investigation as soon as possible after their meeting on
June 15, 1896.56
On June 15, 1895 the committee met again and Carlisle was
examined on the syndicate contract of February 8, 1895. During
his examination Carlisle testified that the bonds of February 8,
1895 were sold to the Belmont-Morgan syndicate only because the
emergency was so great it was dangerous to delay and this syndicate
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could and would supply the gold. On being questioned as to the 
visit of Belmont to Washington about a week before the contract 
was signed, Carlisle said that he did not first suggest the 
transaction but the syndicate did make a proposition which was 
not accepted. The Secretary said that there was no legal obliga­
tion upon him to call for bids, and, furthermore, Morgan and Bel­
mont did not orm the whole group taking the bonds, they merely 
were the heads of a large syndicate. In answer to questions as 
to the price received for the bones Carlisle admitted tnat he 
traded bonds for gold at less\than the market rate but this was 
necessary because of the excitement and uneasiness in the market.
As to the Graves bid, Carlisle explained that he notified Morgan 
that he was required to take those bonds and that Morgan had made 
no claim for the bonds. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury 
Curtis was next examined. He was questioned wholly on his missions 
to Hew York prior to the bond sales, both as to his authority and 
as to his Instructions. In his testimony Curtis said that he was 
first sent to New York by Carlisle in January 1894. His mission 
was to ascertain the general situation, what the people thought 
of the gold withdrawals and whether the people thought that they 
would continue. He said that he did see Morgan, Belmont and 
others on other trips prior to the February 1895 bona sale, but 
that he made no proposition to them. On another visit to Morgan 
on February 2, Morgan thought that they could get the gold but he 
said that he was not prepared to make a definite proposition.
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Morgan and Belmont then came to Washington to see Carlisle.
Curtis testified that they did not bring a contract with tnem but 
that the form of the contract care from the Treasury Department.58
The subcommittee then proceeded to New York for further in­
vestigation. Here, ten witnesses, including Belmont, Morgan, 
Francis L. Stetson, William Graves, ^ohn A. Stewart, Conrad Jordan, 
Henry Chapin Jr., James T, Woodward, Harlan A. Whipple, and James 
Irvine were summoned and examined. Nothing resulted from trie 
Investigation. The committee had tried to prove that there had 
been a plot involving President Cleveland and Secretary Carlisle 
and certain eastern bankers, ^elmont and Morgan declined to 
answer any questions that dealt with the disposal of the bonds 
and prices received for them. This refusal was based on their 
claim that the committee could not force them to reveal private 
business transactions. Their position was correct for the statute 
in regard to recalcitrant witnesses before Congressional committees 
applied only to hearings in the District of Columbia. On June £0 
the committee adjourned and returned to Washington.5^
When this subcommittee returned to Washington it reported to 
the whole committee what was done, or rather, what could not be 
done. No further business was transacted other than the printing 
of the testimony received from the witnesses. The report was made 
to the Senate on March 2, 1897, when Peffer*s resolution, submit­
ted to that body February 7, 1897, was brought before the Senate. 
The resolution is as follows:
Resolved. "That the Commitc.ee on Finance be, and 
it is hereby instructed to report to the Senate curing 
the present session of Congress what action the said 
committee has taken in the matter of the investigation 
under the resolution adopted in the last session of 
Congress directing an investigation of bond sales of 
the Secretary of the Treasury.
In the short debate which followed it was brought out that 
the subcommittee had not agreed on a report. Senator Aldrich 
reported that Harris, who was Chairman of the subcommittee was ill 
and that he was not attending that session, therefore no report 
could be given. Vest, who did most of the questioning of the 
witnesses, said in his brief report that the main purpose of the 
investigation was to find if any of the bonds purchased by the 
syndicate were sold to any Government officials, ana at what 
price. He said that the subcommittee endeavored to comply with 
instructions, but since the witnesses declined to answer and 
since they were unable to make them answer there was nothing left 
for the subcommittee to do except to return and report the refusal 
of those witnesses to answer those questions. He said, however, 
that the minority of the subcommittee suggested to the whole com­
mittee that the witnesses be subpoened and tried before the Senate 
bar where the witnesses could be held for contempt if they refused 
to answer the questions.®^ But It was pointed out by Hill of New 
York, who called the investigation a farce in the first place, 
that bringing the witnesses to Washington would serve no urpose 
because they coulc not be forced to answer. He said further that 
some member of the Government had to be definitely charged with
having received bonds before the witnesses could be forced to 
answer any questions involving that official. Since no one was 
charged with having done wrong, further investigation was but a
gn
waste of time and money.
When Cleveland and Carlisle retired at the end of the term 
they were probably the most unpopular men in the. South and West. 
For four1 years Cleveland had struggled against heavy odds. His 
party was broken up by the Populists, led by Bryan, who were a 
constant obstacle in his effort to maintain the gold standard.
He had forced through Congress the repeal of the silver purchase 
act, insisting that the country was In peril. With all the 
resources of patronage ana social power in his hands, Cleveland 
did not use them in this conflict.
In his fight to preserve the gold reserve, and the gold 
standard, Cleveland lost the support of his party. He had the 
satisfaction, however, of knowing that he had maintained the 
existing standard of value and had lived to see the end of the 
free silver fallacy, which later gripped the West and South.
While Cleveland’s whole policy, including the bond sales, can be 
justified only on the basis of the emergency, it was evident that 
the majority in Congress wa3 ever ready to criticize and was quite 
Ignorant of the real conuition.
When Congress assembled in 1893 the country was in the throes 
of a panic. The stringency on the money market was great, so 
naturally the money question was paramount. Botn Democrats and
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Republicans had for years been coquetting with the free silver 
craze. Both parties were divided on it. The increasing amount 
of silver in the Treasury was driving out gold. Congress failed 
to give the relief he had asked for, and Cleveland was forced to 
rely entirely on his own resources. He maintained the gold 
reserve by his sale of bond issues, one after the other. By this 
means, alone, he was able to restore confidence and avoid loss of 
national credit.
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